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Abstract  
The rise of the radical or extreme right parties in Europe  - parties usually noted for strong, 
sometimes racist anti-immigrant ideologies - has attracted a great deal of attention in 
political science. Ireland, despite having some conditions favourable to the growth of such a 
party has no Radical Right party. This paper argues that that this is because the ‘space’ 
usually occupied by such parties - for young, poor people disaffected by economic change - 
is taken up by Sinn Féin, which though it has similarities to radical right parties, differs 
markedly in its attitudes to immigrants. It goes on to explain the special circumstances that 
prevent nationalist parties in Ireland from presenting overtly anti-immigrant platforms. The 
focus on anti-immigration and liberal economic policies for such parties may mean that 
other parties with strong resemblances are excluded from studies they might usefully be 
included in. 
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Introduction 
The last three decades has seen some increase in support for nationalist, populist and often 
xenophobic parties in Europe. Though these parties are generally small and only rarely 
achieve policy influence through a position in government, political scientists have devoted a 
good deal of attention to what is termed the Extreme or Radical Right (RR). The fact that in 
the 1990s and this decade there have been some high profile Radical Right ‘successes’ in 
Western Europe has fuelled such an interest. Jean Marie Le Pen’s getting to the second round 
in the 2002 French Presidential election, Lijst Pim Fortuyn’s fleeting success in the 
Netherlands in the same year and Jörg Haider’s Freedom Party’s performance in Austria in 
1999 are some such successes, but other European countries such as Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Switzerland and Norway have also seen some RR party success. Though the vast 
body of literature on such parties suggests certain factors that may lead to RR party success 
(see Kitschelt (2007) for a review of the main points of debate) there is not complete 
agreement as to what causes the success of such parties in one country rather than another.  
One country where Radical Right parties have failed to make any impact is Ireland. 
This may be surprising, depending on what one accepts as valid explanations for the rise of 
RR parties. In this article I will argue that Ireland is a place which has conditions amenable to 
the growth of a RR party – rapidly rising immigration, allegations of job displacement, 
increased inequality, a weak and weakening left-right divide, an electoral system that enables 
small newcomers and high levels of candidate-based voting. Despite these features, the only 
generally accepted radical-right group, the Immigration Control Platform, has failed to 
register any notable support.1  
Though some (Fanning and Mutwarasibo 2007; Garner 2007) have argued that an 
anti-immigrant populism adopted by the mainstream parties can explain the absence of a 
success for anti-immigrant parties, this explanation is unconvincing insofar as most of the 
mainstream parties are actively pro-immigration, none has made the issue party political and 
the issue has failed to feature in recent Irish elections. I argue that the reason such a party has 
failed to make progress in Ireland is because Irish nationalism an ongoing ‘struggle’. 
Historically it is based on a philosophy of equality between groups within Ireland (though 
nationalists often failed to adhere to their declared philosophy) and those who might 
                                                 
1 Thought the ICP claims not to be a party, this is more a reflection of its inability to garner votes than efforts to 
compete as a political party. It had fielded candidates in at least two constituencies in each of the last two 
elections.  
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otherwise be likely to support a Radical Right party tend to vote for the most nationalist non-
mainstream party, Sinn Féin, which is in fact a left-wing party. Using data from an Irish 
election study I will show that anti-immigrant and other intolerant views predict increased 
likelihood to support Sinn Féin. This strategy is used by Ignazi (2006) to categorise ‘Extreme 
Right parties’. Sinn Féin, in line with historical nationalist discourse is very supportive of 
minorities’ rights. To espouse an anti-immigrant platform would be dissonant to its 
nationalist mythology. The argument is not that Sinn Féin is an anti-immigrant party in 
disguise rather that its anti-establishment position and its radical nationalism might be 
attractive to the type of voter who in another country, with a different nationalist past, might 
support a radical right-wing party. While this explanation is particularistic to Ireland, it can 
add to our understanding of populist nationalist parties generally. The use of case studies and 
in particular, anomalies, such as Ireland presents, is increasingly recognised as useful to 
theory development (Rogowski 2004). As Sinn Féin is regarded as an economic left-wing 
party it will lead us to question what is meant by Right in terms of the Radical Right and the 
argument is put that this term might be dropped altogether from the definition of this party 
family. If Sinn Féin is similar to RR parties in all areas except xenophobia, then one might 
also question whether the selection rule for the dependent variable used in most cross-
national studies is accurate. If it is not, then the invalidity of the measurement of the 
dependent variable might account for the failure of many studies to agree on the conditions 
for success of such parties. In other words, if one is only selecting some of the parties one 
claims to be explaining variation in, the causal explanation will be biased by this selection 
rule. Taxonomy is important. 
 
 
What are Radical Right parties? 
Despite or perhaps because of the great interest in these types of parties, there is not always 
agreement as to what to call radical right parties not to mind what they actually stand for. 
Mudde (1996) counted 26 different definitions and many more distinguishing features for 
such parties. Since then many more have emerged as each new scholar applies a new one. In 
his most recent work Mudde (2007) offers a ‘maximum definition’ which focuses on three 
core ideological features.  This approach is useful, as it is based on relatively stable ideology 
rather than party policy which will be time and country specific (Mair and Mudde 1998).  
First, Nativism, which is derived from nationalism, indicates the native culture must 
be protected and that power must be returned to the native people. It is related to 
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ethnopluralism which cultures are ‘equal but different’ and must be protected. Mudde (2007: 
19) defines nativism as ‘an ideology which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively 
by members of the native group and that non-native elements are fundamentally threatening’. 
Nativism might then exclude liberal nationalism, but include ‘aggressive, exclusive, 
chauvinistic and historically selective’ nationalism (Hainsworth 1992: 10). 
 A second core feature, Mudde identifies, is Authoritarianism. If authoritarianism is a 
tendency to ‘be subservient to and remain uncritical toward authority figures of the ingroup’ 
(Adorno et al. 1969: 228), this can be interpreted in many ways. It might refer to an 
insistence on a type of behaviour acceptable to the group; certain types of unconventional 
social behaviour, for instance, drug taking or homosexuality, may be punished severely. It 
might also lead to deference to the state’s authority (if the state is congruent with the national 
group identified). It could also refer to the organisation of the party, which might have 
‘charismatic leaders and tight party organisation [which] allow these parties to respond 
quickly and without much internal debate…to exploit new political opportunities’ (Betz 
1998: 9). 
The third feature is Populism, which usually pits a ‘a virtuous and homogenous 
people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’’ (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2007: 3).  
Populist parties tend to see themselves as outsiders to their country’s political system, and 
argue that they represent the opinion of the ‘man on the street’ as opposed to a liberal elite, 
which may be linked to an ‘outgroup’, and which dominates politics and policy making with 
what might be seen as significant failures in policy leading to societal breakdown and 
increasing corruption. This might lead to anti-statism and thus contradict some interpretations 
of authoritarianism. However, the idea that there is an exclusive ‘ingroup’ which is virtuous 
and should be protected runs through these coherent core ideological features. 
As interesting is what is missing from the core-ideology of Populist Radical Right 
parties. There is little to suggest the term ‘Right’ adds anything. A number of writers have 
argued that these parties are economically right-wing or free market (Kitschelt 2007; Swank 
and Betz 1995). Yet increasingly support comes from those who are losers of neo-liberal 
economics and economic modernisation and the policies of these parties are often 
protectionist, anti-globalisation and supportive of an extensive welfare state (see in particular 
Mudde 2007: ch. 5). One study has found attitudes to economic equality are the least useful 
explanation for RR country-level support (Norris 2005: 184).  
If it is not economic right that is referred to, it is unclear in what way or why the term 
right is employed. Many writer simply take the nomenclature ‘Right’ as a given, and argue 
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over the adjective used to qualify this (Given 2005: 18-21; Norris 2005: 44-46). Ignazi 
(2006: 17-18) suggests the term is appropriate in part because of the association of some of 
the RR parties with fascism and in part because of their anti-communism. It is Right, because 
it is against the Left. Mudde, following Bobbio (1996), takes the term to denote an 
acceptance of a natural order of inequalities. It is not clear that this is related to the core 
ideological features that he outlined, rather this would seem to be closer to economic 
orientation for which left and right is most commonly used. Indeed it is the case that there are 
left nationalists, left populists and leftist authoritarian parties. One might expect a party that 
respected a ‘natural order’ would oppose state intervention against immigration. Mair (2007: 
220) has suggested that left-right as a shorthand device, if becoming opaque, is no longer 
useful. For the purpose of denoting this party family a more useful label could be populist-
nationalist (Mény and Surel 2002: 4). If one were to remove the connection with the right the 
party type may be opened to other parties not currently considered. 
 
Conditions for RR party success in Ireland 
Most writers in the field attempt to discern what conditions are necessary or sufficient for RR 
party success or identify those factors that correlate with RR party success. Kitschelt (2007) 
and Rydgren (2004) have identified from the literature a number of conditions that might 
make a country amenable to RR success.  
1. A post industrial society exposed to rapid industrial change of the labour force 
(including the marginalisation of low-skilled workers) and attractive to immigrants 
from less economically advanced countries, and have encompassing welfare state.  
2. High levels of immigration and popular intolerance of immigration (Lubbers, 
Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002) 
3. Increased importance of the cultural cleavage.  
4. Convergence in the political space and dealignment of the party attachments.   
5. Openness of the party system to new entrants – a proportional electoral system 
6. Partyocracy – where the parties are closely interlinked with the state. Partiocratic 
behaviour, such as clientelism, patronage and corruption may cause a sense of ‘crisis 
of democracy’ (Veugelers and Magnan 2005). 
 
The first condition identified here is is the post industrial society.  On these ground Kitschelt 
excluded Ireland (Kitschelt and McGann 1995: 257-8). And more recently Kitschelt (2007: 
1193) claims the socio-economic condition and weakness of the welfare state should exclude 
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Ireland from any analysis. While Ireland may never have been an industrial country, it 
certainly has the characteristics of a post-industrial one. High levels of immigration have lead 
to debates on job displacement as new forms of work predominate that alienate traditional 
working class roles. There was a six percent decline in manufacturing employment between 
2002 and 2006, while the far less stable construction and services sectors expanded. In terms 
of social welfare, though Ireland’s public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP is 
among the lowest in Europe (for 2003 it stood at 16 percent compared to an EU-15 average 
of 24 percent (OECD 2007: 193)), this is a poor indicator of Ireland’s social welfare 
provisions as Irish GDP is much higher than GNP due to levels of foreign direct investment. 
As a percentage of GNP it would be more like other western European countries. Indeed the 
annual growth in public expenditure between 1996 and 2003 was over 13 percent, and 
government transfers to the bottom three deciles, at 31 percent, is above the OECD average 
(OECD 2005: Table EQ2.2).  
For the second condition, the demographic structure of Ireland has changed radically 
in the last decade. Where almost 95 percent of the population was born in Ireland (north and 
south) in 1996 by 2006 this had fallen to 86 percent (Central Statistics Office 2003: 24). In 
2002 almost 93 percent of people living in Ireland claimed Irish nationality by 2006 this fell 
to just below 89 percent. The number of non-Irish nationals increased by 87 percent to 
420,000 in four years between 2002 and 2006 (Central Statistics Office 2007: 24-5). The 
most recent census also shows that in many parts of Dublin over a quarter of the population 
are immigrants. This is especially the case in the large working class estates in the west of the 
city such as Tallaght, Clondalkin and Blanchardstown (Irish Times 8th August, 2007). Some 
organisations have suggested that the census undercounts the immigrant population 
significantly. For instance the Irish Congress of Trade Unions considers the estimate of 
11,000 Chinese people in the census well short of other estimates of 100,000 (Wall 2007). 
The estimate of 60,000 Poles does not tally with the number of PPS (social security) numbers 
issued. Between May 2004 and March 2006 110,342 numbers were issued to Polish citizens, 
which would indicate that more than this immigrated to Ireland in that time as spouses and 
children may not have applied for PPS numbers (NESC 2006: 136). The scale and the 
rapidity of the increase of numbers of immigrants living in many parts of the country and 
especially working class areas of the cities compares with the levels of immigration in other 
parts of Europe where RR parties have grown such as Austria and Belgium (Ignazi 2006: 
118, 135).  
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Irish unemployment hovered at about five percent in the last decade as the Irish 
economy boomed. The economic boom raised Irish living standards generally and though 
inequality has grown, Ireland’s national morale is among the highest in Europe. Recent 
research also found that Irish community and social integration remains strong (Fahey, 
Russell, and Whelan 2007). Others have offered a much gloomier view of the ‘Celtic Tiger’, 
claiming that social deprivation and exclusion is widespread and that communities are 
severely damaged by the Irish economic model (Kirby, Jacobson, and Ó Broin 2006). As one 
of the most globalised economies in the world is it more exposed to the risks of globalisation. 
What has been claimed by a large trade union and a former leader of the Labour party is that 
the high levels of immigration, with no enhanced job security and social protection have 
caused Irish workers to suffer in ‘a race to the bottom’ (Brennock 2006). In the run up to the 
election there was some if limited debate on the topic: in the context of the laying off of Irish 
staff in Irish Ferries and closure of some manufacturing plants the Labour party leader 
reiterated his concerns of job displacement (Irish Times 8th March 2007) and the prime 
minister expressed concern about the sustainability of the rates of immigration (Irish Times 
24th April 2007).  
 Nor are Irish people more tolerant than those in other countries with significant RRPs. 
An opinion poll in 2006 showed that 63 percent of Irish people polled felt that the presence 
of foreign workers threatens pay and working conditions for Irish people. 70 percent did not 
want any more immigrants to enter Ireland, and over 40 percent wanted to see some 
immigrants sent home (Brennock 2006). A special Eurobarometer (2007: 44) report found 
that 62 percent of Irish people felt ‘people of different ethnic origin…enrich the national 
culture’. This was below the EU average and below France, the Netherlands and Denmark. 
Only Austria with a 46 percent positive response was much lower than Ireland of western 
European countries.  
 Despite the high levels of immigration there has not been any special concern about 
the protection of Irish culture, and none that immigrants are the threat to that culture. Only 
Sinn Féin has focussed on the issue of the native Irish language and culture, seeking extra 
(usually British) state support for these and for native Irish sports, and criticised that ‘the key 
targets of public investment have been museums, profile theatres and so-called 'high art' 
companies (opera, etc)’ (Sinn Féin 2001: 7).  
 The fourth condition relates to the availability of policy space for new entrants to 
exploit, and whether party attachments have been sufficiently weakened that new parties can 
expect voters to switch. Kitchelt (1995: 11-25) argued that when the right and left converge, 
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this allows RRPs to emerge. There could be a perception of there being no real choice - 
‘when democratic politics has lost its capacity to mobilize people around distinct political 
projects…, the conditions are ripe for political demagogues to articulate popular frustration’ 
(Mouffe 2005: 70). Estimates of Irish parties’ policy positions show that all parties, with the 
exception of the Green party, moved to the centre between 1997 and 2002 (Benoit and Laver 
2003). Indeed the left-right gap is lower than any other country in the Lubbers’ study (Norris 
2005: 194). In addition, an alternative van der Brug et al (2005) thesis which holds that the 
gap between left and right is not so important as the position of the major right wing party, 
also indicates that Ireland has sufficient space for a RR party. On this measure Ireland is 
again the extreme case with the largest free electoral space (Norris 2005: 194). Dealignment 
of the Irish party system has occurred over time and Irish party identification is so low that 
short term factors are increasingly important in deciding elections (Marsh 2006). 
 A fifth condition concerns the permissiveness of the electoral institutions to emerging 
(usually small) parties. Ireland’s PR-STV electoral system is suited to new party emergence. 
Empirically new parties have been able to achieve Dáil (parliamentary) representation with 
relatively low support. So, in 2002, with less than four percent of the vote each, two parties 
got eight and six seats in the 166 seat chamber. In 2007 the Green party formed part of the 
government even though it polled less than five percent. Additionally, because the electoral 
system requires voters to choose candidates, and many voters make choices based on 
candidate (Marsh 2007), the system is ideal for charismatic politicians and single-issue 
independents to succeed.  
If partocracy, a sixth condition, is characterised by patronage, clientelism and 
corruption as Kitchelt (1995: 161) suggests, Ireland would seem to be an exemplary case. 
Collins (2004: 601) claims ‘corruption and clientelism are…well established as focal points 
for comment on Irish politics’. Though Ireland has comparatively low levels of perceived 
corruption, a large number of tribunals in recent years have given the impression that Irish 
politics has become more corrupt (Murphy 2005). In addition the main party, Fianna Fáil has 
governed for 18 of the last twenty years and has increased state funding for parties. 
Here and in the other ways mentioned above Ireland is unexceptional in a western 
European context and would seem to provide the right conditions for the existence of RR 
party, yet it failed to become a political issue or be exploited by parties. Marsh (2007) reports 
that only two percent of voters mentioned immigration as an issue for them when deciding 
how to vote.  
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Explanations for the absence of an anti-immigrant party in Ireland 
We can identify a number of explanations for the absence of RR parties in Ireland in the last 
decade. One explanation that has been proposed by Fanning and Mutwarasibo (2007) and 
Garner (2007) argues that the Irish political system, with non-ideological populist nationalist 
parties dominating reduces the space available to RR parties. In addition, by promoting 
populist anti-immigrant measures Irish parties effectively provide the types of rhetoric and 
policy that RR parties emerge to supply. Specifically both articles look at the Citizenship 
referendum in 2004 in which the citizenship rules were changed to remove the automatic 
right of citizenship to anyone born on the island of Ireland. It was introduced as a reaction to 
what some saw as ‘citizenship tourism’, where anecdotal evidence was offered that some 
British residents were travelling to Belfast and Dublin for the birth of their children on the 
assumption that once the child was granted citizenship, their right to remain in the EU would 
be secure. This assumption was based on the fact that under the 1998 Good Friday 
Agreement anyone born on the island of Ireland was entitled to Irish citizenship and on a 
legal decision that children have a right to the ‘company and protection’ of their parents, that 
citizens have a right to live in the state and therefore the parents of citizens cannot be 
removed from the state. The extent to which this was happening was disputed and the courts 
reversed the decision to grant automatic residency rights to parents of citizens. But the legal 
decision retained some ambiguity, which the government sought to remove through this 
referendum. 
The claim is that this referendum effectively ‘racialised’ Irish citizenship, and used 
language which pandered to populism. However, Ireland already had a jus sanguinis element 
to its citizenship and the new rule remains much more liberal than that of the UK, which 
requires ten year residency for those born of foreign parents before citizenship can be applied 
for (Weil 2001). In fact most of the opposition to the referendum at the time was to the way it 
was brought forward – without much time for debate, consultation and at the same time as 
European and local elections – rather than to the substance of the proposed constitutional 
amendment.  
The evidence Fanning and Mutwarasibo (2007) and Garner (2007) provide for 
heightened populism and anti-immigrant rhetoric is minimal, but their explanation would be 
plausible if the parties did act in a way that would have appealed to anti-immigrant 
sentiment. In fact the claim by Garner (2007: 116) that Fine Gael included a call for AIDS-
testing and fingerprinting all foreigners in its 2002 election manifesto is untrue. Apart from 
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their claims about the nature of citizenship referendum these writers’ best evidence is that 
Noel O’Flynn, a backbench Fianna Fáil TD (MP), had made claims that he was  
‘against the spongers, the freeloaders, the people screwing the system. [There 
are] too many are coming to Ireland…In the past five years there have been 
35,000 applications for asylum and 80 per cent of those have been from 
illegal immigrants using the refugee system to get in’ (Irish Times 29 January 
2002).  
O’Flynn received no formal sanction from his party; he was merely criticised and told ‘to 
shut up’ by his party leader. Yet this alone hardly constitutes strong evidence of ‘anti-asylum 
populism within the mainstream’ (Fanning and Mutwarasibo 2007: 442). 
A second explanation might be that the conditions are in fact not suitable for the rise 
of an RR party. Though many factors exist, other necessary conditions may not. For instance, 
it might be difficult for such a party to make a breakthrough because a right-wing reactionary 
press does not exist in the same way it does in the UK. However the Irish editions of the UK 
tabloid press, which have large readerships do offer the type of anti-immigrant opinion that 
might induce hostility to immigrants among the native population. For instance the Irish 
Mirror ran an untrue story with the headline ‘Free Cars for Refugees: Cash Grants Buy 
BMWs’ on 16 September 2002. Earlier research by Pollak (1999) showed that this was a 
common phenomenon, and he collated many similar headlines.  
Tolerance of immigrants, or the lack of it, will have a number of different causes. The 
literature is not clear on which are important in relation to RR parties, but material or 
economic threat (whether objective or perceived), racial and (objective or perceived) cultural 
threat due to difference in religion or language are probably important. Judging by campaigns 
of RR parties, part of it is based on the economic threat of immigration by those sections that 
compete with immigrants. The evidence above shows that there are some fears of job 
displacement in Ireland. If intolerance to migrants is partly racial in origin, then immigration 
of racially-similar groups to the native population may not elicit negative responses. Nearly 
95 percent of the population of Ireland is white and of non-Irish living in Ireland over 70 
percent identify themselves as white. In addition there are reportedly fewer than 32,000 
Muslims in the country (Central Statistics Office 2007: Tables 1A & 7). Many immigrants to 
Ireland are white Eastern Europeans. As such the cultural threat by the dominant immigrant 
groups to Ireland is probably low. This, however, is not unlike the type of immigration which 
the FPÖ successfully mobilised support against, and is in contrast to the immigration of 
Africans and non-white South Americans that predominates in Spain and Portugal.  
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Allport’s (1954) famous contact thesis would suggest that where different groups 
come into contact then tolerance is more likely. One of the ways inter-group contact is 
impeded severely is linguistic barriers. Many immigrants to Ireland, especially from CEE 
stand out in one important way; that English is not their native language. No data are 
available on the linguistic ability of immigrants, but the increased costs to the state of 
translation services would indicate that this might form a barrier.  
A further difference with immigration to Ireland is that the immigrants have no 
(negative) historical associations with the country. Unlike say Pakistanis, Indians or Irish to 
Britain or Algerians to France, immigrants to Ireland will harbour no resentment to the host 
country as a result of previous imperial occupation. Whether these factors have lessened 
possible tensions between immigrants and the native population and hence reduced the 
demand for a RR party would require further research. Yet it is clear from survey data cited 
above that Irish people do perceive high levels of immigration and a large minority see it as 
excessive.  
The explanation that is explored here is that Sinn Féin attracts support from those 
who might support RR parties in other parts of Europe. We can ask why do these people 
support Sinn Féin and why does it not exploit this opportunity by adopting anti-immigrant 
rhetoric. Sinn Féin is an extreme, often violently nationalist party which has promoted the 
exclusion of those it sees as outsiders and is anti-establishment condemning mainstream 
parties and the EU for a lack of democracy, corruption and waste. Mudde (2007: 51) has 
argued that Sinn Féin satisfies many of the criteria for classification as Populist Radical 
Right. Yet Sinn Féin sees itself as a radical leftist party, in favour of a strong social welfare 
state, increased protectionism and against globalisation.  
If origins can tell us something about a party, then the origins of Provisional Sinn 
Féin, as the party was first known, were actually a reaction against left-wing politics of 
Official Sinn Féin. One leader of the Provisionals, Joe Cahill, 
‘had a feeling that ultra-left politics were taking over. As far as I was concerned, the 
main purpose of the IRA and Sinn Féin was to break the connection with England 
and get the Brits from Ireland.’   
 
For the Official Sinn Féin leadership, Cahill and people like him, ‘were simply right-wingers 
living in a fantasy world and clinging to a romantic past’ (Taylor 1998: 24). The Provisionals 
saw the original party as having being infiltrated with ‘Red Agents’ whereas the new Belfast-
based Sinn Féin were defenders of their community whose ‘allegiance [was] to God and 
Ireland’ (Moloney 2002: 75). It also appears authoritarian; Moloney (2002) in particular 
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suggests that the organisation is tightly controlled by the leader and a group around him. 
Despite being most outspoken in the defence of human rights it is known that the party was 
involved in punishment beatings for ‘anti-social behaviour’, and the party is the strongly 
supportive of ‘restorative community justice’. So Sinn Féin has certain aspects in common 
with RR parties – its nationalism, even nativism if the ‘outgroup’ is Britons, authoritarianism 
and populism – but is distinctly pro-immigrants rights and while sometimes equivocal on 
moral issues such as abortion and homosexuality is not more conservative than other Irish 
parties. In the next section I will look at Sinn Féin in more detail and specifically study 
whether despite its position on immigration, it attracts support from those who would 
typically be RR supporters in other countries.  
 
Sinn Féin: a tolerant party with intolerant supporters? 
Many works on the radical right tend to study voters attitudes and characteristics. This has 
led to some firm conclusions and consensus. Given (2005: 46) finds that ‘in general, survey 
evidence indicates that radical right voters are predominantly male, blue collar workers or 
small business owners who have a low level of education’. Immerfall (1998: 250) 
characterises the median voter of RR parties as ‘a younger male, with no college education, 
working in a blue collar job in the private sector and living in an urban environment’. These 
are ‘losers-of-modernisation’ – people who have not profited from neo-liberal policies of free 
trade and increased globalisation of manufacturing and services. The concomitant 
downgrading of public services and welfare supports hits them hardest, and the cause of their 
position appears obvious to them – excessive demand placed on these resources by 
immigrants. Having become disillusioned with the state and the liberal establishment these 
people will have anti-system, anti-establishment attitudes.  
Table 1 shows some demographic characteristics of Sinn Féin votes in the last three 
elections which are very much in line with what are usually called radical or extreme right 
parties. Sinn Féin’s voters are (statistically and substantively) significantly more likely to be 
working class. There is an obvious and strong relationship with age. Support among the 
young is four times higher than among pensioners. The rural/ urban divide and gender gap 
exist but are less pronounced than one might expect. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Sinn Féin voters are also likely to feel aggrieved at or not part of the economic growth 
Ireland has experienced in the last fifteen years. 21 percent of Sinn Féin voters thought their 
quality of life had not improved in the five years up to 2002 compared to 12 percent among 
voters of other parties (own calculation of RTÉ exit poll, 2002).  
 An analysis of a 1989 Lansdowne survey (n=945) and Garry et al’s (2003) analysis of 
RTÉ exit poll (n=3175) shows support for Fianna Fáil dropped between 1989 and 2002, but 
did so most significantly among the young – from 50.5 percent to 35 percent among 18-24 
year olds, compared to 51.6 percent to 42 percent in the general population.2 It is noteworthy 
that Labour has become a much more middle class party. Whereas in 1989 support for 
Labour among the middle class was 9.4 percent as opposed to 11.2 percent generally, by 
2002 it was at 14.1 percent among the middle classes compared to an overall level of 12.5 
percent.3 Conversely support among the working classes fell from 15.9 percent in 1989 to 
11.9 in 2002. This would seem to indicate that the shift in support to Sinn Féin, which is 
primarily among the young and working class could have come from these two parties. Of 
those who voted for Sinn Féin in 2002 and 2007 after those who either did not, could not or 
voted for Sinn Féin in the previous elections are removed, half of the remainder had switched 
from Fianna Fáil (RTÉ exit polls, 2002 & 2007). 
A multivariate analysis of Irish voters can be used to investigate both the socio-
demographic characteristics of Sinn Féin supporters and their attitudes. I use Irish National 
Election Study data. Probability to give Sinn Féin a first preference vote (PTV) is used as the 
dependent variable. PTV has a number of advantages over taking just the respondents who 
will or have voted for a party (see van der Eijk and Franklin 1996). Small parties, by their 
nature, translate into a small number subjects in surveys (usually less than 100). By using 
PTVs it increases the sample size. Because PTVs are on an interval scale we lose less 
information and can reasonably use OLS regression.  
 Model 1 in Table 2 looks at socio-demographic variables and confirms that what we 
see in Table 1 using a different dataset. Age, sex and income are all significant and in the 
expected directions. So the younger and poorer you are the more likely you will consider 
voting for Sinn Féin. Men are more likely to vote Sinn Féin than women. Sinn Féin voters 
                                                 
2 These are both from opinion polls. The 1989 probably over estimated support for Fianna Fáil, though this is 
irrelevant to my argument as we are looking at changes in comparative difference within Fianna Fáil support. 
3 The 1989 support for Labour reported here actually includes support for the Workers’ Party, the original home 
of a group of breakaway TDs who formed Democratic Left and which merged with Labour in 1999. What 
remains of the Workers’ Party is a tiny rump. 
 14
are less well educated, even when controlling for age. So Sinn Féin voters are more likely to 
be young, poorly educated men - the type of voter that might support a RR party. 
However to make the case that Sinn Féin voters are more or less like supporters of 
RR parties we need to see their attitudes to certain groups and issues. Contrary to what one 
might expect, given Sinn Féin’s policies, Sinn Féin supporters are more likely to feel that 
there are already too many immigrants in Ireland. Sinn Féin supporters are not more likely to 
consider asylum seekers entitled to full state welfare benefits. This is surprising given the 
tone of Sinn Féin policy. In Model 3 ‘Efficacy’ shows that those who think their vote not 
count and changes in party not to matter are more likely to consider voting for Sinn Féin. 
This is unsurprising for an anti-system party. The other variable measuring the extent to 
which respondents consider it their duty to vote is not a useful predictor. Model 4 adds a 
variable measuring opinion on Northern Ireland where lower responses indicate greater 
insistence on a united Ireland. These show that as one might expect, and that those who are 
more demanding of a united Ireland will vote Sinn Féin. It is noteworthy that even when an 
item on Northern Ireland is added – Sinn Féin’s central policy plank – the negative attitude to 
immigrants is still a predictor of Sinn Féin support. Other variables tested but not shown 
indicate that subjective left-wing voters are more likely to support Sinn Féin, but an objective 
left-right measure of economic policy is not significant. Though the socio-demographic 
profile and the low political efficacy might be consistent with Sinn Féin as a radical left 
party, what is of interest is that Sinn Féin support is correlated with anti-immigrant 
sentiment. This result is stable and robust across different models. This is especially 
unexpected given the age profile of the party’s support. 
Other evidence supports this interpretation of the data. In 2004 the referendum on 
Citizenship (discussed above) was easily passed with nearly 80 percent of voters supporting 
the change. Sinn Féin opposed the change and campaigned vigorously on the issue taking a 
liberal, pro-immigrant rights line. An opinion poll taken at the start of campaigning showed a 
majority of people (54 percent) in favour of the change, including 56 percent of Sinn Féin 
supporters. This is despite the fact that working class (C2DE) voters were less likely to 
support the change (Irish Times 24th May 2004). We can also look at the vote transfers from 
the only explicitly anti-immigrant candidate to run and achieve reasonable vote in the 2002 
election. A quarter of the Immigration Control Platform candidate, Áine Ní Chonnaill’s 921 
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transferable votes went to the Sinn Féin candidate, more than for any other party.4 The 
inconsistencies between voter and party ideology may indicate that Sinn Féin voters do not 
vote on certain policy issues, which are not important except in terms of the larger goal of 
national self determination. To this end it chose to align itself to international radical left in 
order to end its political isolation, but sold itself differently to its Irish-American audience 
(Frampton 2004). Another factor is that voters may not support Sinn Féin on its policies at 
all, or may become drawn to its policies only after being drawn to the party through its 
community activities, just as many radical Islamic groups draw support on the basis of 
tangible welfare services they supply (Cavatorta 2008). Sinn Féin’s community activism is 
important to its support (Doyle 2005), with anti-bin charges and anti-drug campaigns being 
most prominent. Many have alleged that this activism is closer to vigilantism (Maillot 2005: 
91-94). Apart from the Northern Ireland issue, Sinn Féin’s voters tend to be more interested 
in local issues, housing, unemployment and drugs than voters for other parties, and less 
interested in the economy and the environment (analysis of 2002 and 2007 RTÉ exit poll). If 
parties whose support comes from the politically disengaged relies on its activity on local 
issues, then the parties’ positions on some issues may not be relevant. Just as Sinn Féin’s 
position on Iraq is irrelevant or unknown to those in the US who finance the party, its 
position on immigration maybe irrelevant or unknown to supporters in Dublin housing 
estates. 
 Rydgren (2005) has argued that party types contagion of party types is possible as a 
innovative new party’s ‘master frame’ is copied and adapted by new parties. Sinn Féin has 
not copied a RR ‘master frame’, but its expression of nationalism has been adapted to local 
historical conditions. Nationalist ideology in Ireland has a very different experience on which 
to draw, compared to the rest of Europe. All nationalist parties attempt to reserve power for 
their group. This is why nationalists are against internationalism as it cedes power out of their 
country. Irish nationalists tend to argue that Catholics in Ireland and latterly in Northern 
Ireland were victimised and so seek power and resources for this group. Nationalist parties 
tend to engage in mythmaking and in glorifying the past. Ireland’s ‘glorious’ past was that of 
a struggle against colonial powers, so we’d expect to see that the rhetoric of an ultra-
nationalist party would be different. 
One of Irish nationalism’s rallying cries is a call to arms against discrimination of the 
Irish in Britain. The alleged existence of ‘No Dogs, No Blacks, No Irish’ or ‘No Irish need 
                                                 
4 Ireland has an electoral system in which each voter is asked to rank order each candidate in a multi-seat 
constituency. It is a system which offers no rationale to vote any way other than sincerely. 
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apply’ signs in the UK features in Irish nationalist songs and mythology. Even if it were 
minded to, to engage in anti-minority campaigns Sinn Féin or any Irish nationalist party 
would be inconsistent with the other (more important) aspect of its ongoing nationalist 
campaign, which is to achieve recognition for its minority culture in the UK (in the short 
term) and take control over this territory in the long term. Such dissonance would, 
presumably, damage opinion of the party, especially in the media, and perhaps damage it 
electorally.  
 
Conclusion 
Ireland’s political and social structure makes it conducive to the presence of a reasonably 
successful RR party. Yet Ireland has none according to conventional classifications. It was 
shown that potential supporters of such a party tend to support Sinn Féin. Though displaying 
some features of RR parties – nationalism, populism and authoritarianism Sinn Féin, is 
avowedly leftist and pro-immigrant rights. That these voters end up voting for a left-wing 
party leads one first to question the utility of the left-right denomination for Radical Right 
parties. Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (2002) in attempting to explain attitudes to the EU have 
argued (convincingly) that the left-right definition of politics is essentially meaningless. They 
argue that parties can be categorised into two types: GAL or TAN. These are Green, 
alternative, libertarian parties and traditional, authoritarian, nationalist parties. TAN parties 
are more likely to be anti-European. Similarly we may see that the normal left-right divide is 
not useful to understand attitudes to nationalism or immigration. We can see that in the UK 
one Labour government minister suggested eight out of ten people in her ‘Labour heartland’ 
constituency were considering voting for the BNP (The Sunday Telegraph April 16, 2006). 
Elsewhere we can see that parties such as the German NPD campaign against neo-liberal 
reforms (Business Week 28 February, 2005). Equally, there are left-wing parties with similar 
anti-elite, anti-EU and anti-globalisation views and populist rhetoric that we associate with 
the Radical Right such as the Dutch Socialist Party and the Italian PRC.  
Second we can ask why Sinn Féin does not exploit this issue. Here one needs to look 
at the specific environment in which a party operates. Crucially nationalism in Ireland cannot 
sit easily with anti-immigrant bigotry, so it is less likely that a nationalist party in Ireland 
could be xenophobic. Sinn Féin can attract this support for its nationalist campaign through 
anti-system populism, community activism and alleged vigilantism. So when we look for 
other manifestations of the core ideology Mudde identifies, Sinn Féin provides a good 
exemplar.  
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Table 1: Sinn Féin voters 1997, 2002 and 2007 
 Sinn Féin 1997 0 éin 2007  Sinn Féin 2 02 Sinn F
Total 3.3 7.1 7.3 
    
1 4.5 3.5/ 5.6 
0 10.3 
0 2.4 3.5 
   
4 14.5 10.7 
4 8.7 9.9 
1 6.7 7.9 
8 4.6 5
.
6 
8 3.6 1.5 
  
rban * 4.2 8 7.8 
9 5.8 6.5 
  
Middle class† 1.4
Working class 5. 8.7/ 13.3 
Farmers  1.
 
18-24 5.
25-34 4.
35-49 3.
50-64 1.
65+ 1.
  
U
Rural  2.
  
Male  4.4 8.4 8.4 
Female 2.0 5.8 6.1 
Sources: own analysis of RTÉ/ Lansdowne exit poll 1997 and 2002, and Marsh (2007). * For 1997 
rban refers to Dublin versus not Dublin. † For 2007 class cells refer to the market research 
lassifications AB/ C1 and C2/ DE in Middle and Working class respectively.  
 
 
U
c
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Table 2 – OLS models predicting PTV Sinn Féin 
Not probable / probable to give to Sinn Féin 1st preference (1-10 scale) 
 
 Model    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Socio-demographics  
Age in years    -0.052** -0.053** -0.050** -0.046** 
     (13.70)  (13.65)  (12.71)  (11.74) 
Sex (M=1; F=2)   -0.331** -0.334** -0.350** -0.290* 
     (2.76)  (2.78)  (2.91)  (2.45) 
Highest level of education  -0.279** -0.257** -0.228** -0.187** 
 (6 point scale)   (5.29)  (4.80)  (4.19)  (3.49) 
Level of net household income  -0.224** -0.220** -0.191** -0.169** 
 (4 point scale)   (3.46)  (3.39)  (2.92)  (2.63) 
 
Social attitudes 
Immigrants in Ireland – already too many  0.137** 0.130** 0.115** 
 (7 point scale)     (3.45)  (3.30)  (2.94) 
Asylum seekers – same rights as Irish   0.050  0.053  0.046 
 (7 point scale)     (1.48)  (1.57)  (1.40) 
 
Voter type  
Duty to vote in election       -0.068  -0.072 
 (7 point scale)       (1.59)  (1.73) 
Efficacy – vote doesn’t count/ parties don’t matter   0.051*  0.060** 
 (14 point scale)       (2.49)  (2.97) 
 
Political attitudes 
Insist on or abandon goal of united Ireland – self placement    -0.167** 
 (11 point scale)         (8.67) 
 
 
Constant   8.015**  7.002** 6.756** 7.062** 
    (21.64)   (14.77)  (12.23)  (12.97) 
Observations   2221   2221  2221  2221 
R-squared (adjusted)  0.08   0.09  0.09  0.12 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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